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Supreme Court Review
With respect, it is submitted the nice distinction drawn by Mart-
land J. between contractors liable to do the work themselves and
those liable only to have it done by others has no justification in the
normal factual situation. The reliance in both instances is the same.
General contractors could have avoided liability by insisting that the
owners make direct contracts with subcontractors whose selection
they might advise. This distinction reduces the already fading margin
of liability for the work of independent contractors.
Caine Fur Farms Ltd. v. Kokolsky, [1963] S.C.R. 315.
What is the liability of a dog owner for damage done by his dog
when it is allowed to run free?
This issue was raised before the Supreme Court of Canada in
the recently-decided case of Caine Fur Farms Limited v. Kokolsky.1
The case involved the owners of two adjoining mink farms. The
defendant, Caine Fur Farms Ltd., in contravention of a provincial
statute and a municipal by-law, had allowed its dog to run at large
during the whelping season, a time when female mink are easily agi-
tated and if upset have a tendency to destroy their young. The dog
got into plaintiff's compound and climbed on the tops of mink cages,
causing the mink to destroy a large number of their young.
It was argued on behalf of the defendant that as the dog was
a domestic animal, liability for damages caused by it could only
arise if scienter were proved. Furthermore it was argued that, since
dogs do not by the common law make their owners strictly liable for
trespass, in the present case the defendant could not be held liable
for the damage resulting from the dog's trespass.
The Court had little difficulty in dealing with these arguments.
Relying on two cases, Farden v. Harcourt-Rivington,2 a House of
Lords decision, and Fleming v. Atkinson,3 a decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, it reaffirmed the principle that, in dealing with
cases of animal damage and animal trespass, negligence was a com-
pletely separate cause of action, to which the ordinary defences of
the common law relating to animal damage and animal trespass did
not apply. From this point the Court had no difficulty in finding that,
in the circumstances, between the two mink farmers, there was a
duty to keep the dog restrained, since the presence of a strange dog
might agitate the mink. Letting the dog run at large is a breach
of duty and the defendant is liable for the resulting damage.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 315.
.2 (1932) 146 L.T. 391.
3 [1959] S.C.R. 513.
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Of special interest in the case was the part played by a provincial
statute4 requiring owners of dogs not to let their dogs run free during
that particular period of time, and a by-law5 covering the particular
area, requiring dogs to be kept under restraint at all times. Counsel
for the plaintiff had argued that these legislative enactments estab-
lished an absolute statutory liability which would entitle one damaged
by their breach to succeed in a claim for damages i.e. the legislation
provided a separate cause of action. The Court did not find it
necessary to determine this, and it is submitted that, according to
the principles laid down in the case of Commerford v. Board of
School Commissioners of HalifaX,6 a decision of the Supreme Court
of Nova Scotia, this would have been difficult to establish.
But that the legislation had some effect was evident from the
reasoning of Martland J He concluded that the legislation answered
the contention made for the defendant that, under the common law,
the owner of a dog could not be held liable for negligence for letting
his dog run free. For this principle the plaintiff relied on the case of
Buckle v. Holmes.8 The Court had already pointed out that, though
Buckle v. Holmes decided that dogs were a class of animal which
did not by their trespass make their owners strictly liable, Farden v.
Harcourt-Rivington decided that negligence was a supervening and
separate cause of action. So it is obvious that, even if the legislation
were not in force, the Court was prepared to hold that in the cir-
cumstances of this case, there was liability for negligence. Yet Mart-
land J. concluded that the legislation answered the defendant's con-
tention that by the common law the owner of a dog could not be
held liable for letting his dog run free.
It is submitted that, from this reasoning, and from the similar
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Fleming
v. Atkinson,9 courts in this country are prepared to act as if the
common law of England regarding animal trespass and animal damage
had been changed by Canadian conditions and legislation. In Feming
v. Atkinson, plaintiff automobile driver was injured when his car
struck and killed two cows of a herd which had been left grazing
unattended on the highway. The Court held as in the Caine case,
that there was negligence which superseded any defence based on
the common law absence of duty to act to prevent the escape of
animals onto the highway and absence of duty towards persons using
that highway. The Court was astute to point out that differences in
Canadian conditions rendered the English common law rules irrele-
vant in this respect.
Apparently there is a trend in these decisions to weaken the
common law rules, and then act as if superseding negligence overrules
4 The Game Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 126, s. 44.
5 By-law No. 205 of The Municipal District of Strathcona.6 [1950] 2 D.L.R. 207.
7 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 318.
8 [1926) 2 K.B. 125.
9 Supra, footnote 2.
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their application anyway. However, it is germane to point out that
there are two directions the courts can take at this juncture. One
is to continue as they have, to resolve the cases in terms of negligence
acting as if the negligence is something separate-and, as will here-
after be suggested, this is not wholly true; the other is to come
right out and say that the common law position has been changed,
and the basis of liability is different from what it was under the
common law.
If the courts continue to follow the first course, it should be
pointed out that they cannot help incorporating changes in the com-
mon law into their deliberations on negligence. It is clear that certain
value judgments lie below the surface of the expression "breach
of a duty of care." When it is said that a man has broken his duty
of care what is meant is not only that he must be taken to have
realized that his act or omission was likely to damage some other, but
as well that there is a clash between two spheres-the freedom of
action that the law allows him, and the things he cannot do lest he
damage others. The greater the one sphere, the lesser the other.
In the Caine case, the Court took into account the fact that the law,
didn't permit the defendant to let his dog run free, in deciding that
he had broken his duty of care. If the law had permitted him to
let his dog run free, it would have been more difficult to find him
guilty of breaking his duty of care. Behind the change in the law,
prima facie external to the duty of care, but plainly, on closer
examination, germane to it, are the thousand changing social condi-
tions that link the two up.
Suppose, however, that the courts were to take the other course
open to them-that of deciding that the common law position has
been changed. In the Caine case, Martland J. did not find it necessary
to determine whether or not an absolute statutory liability was im-
posed on the defendant, but it is submitted that, if the common law
rule has changed, then an absolute common 7aw liability could have
been imposed on the defendant, so that he could be held strictly liable
for trespass by a dog just as for a cow or a horse.
This has interesting implications assuming that most urban areas
in this country have legislation in force imposing restraint on dogs,
and that for these areas the courts would decide that the new com-
mon law rule applied, any person who suffered minor damage from
a stray dog, such as injury to lawns and uprooting of flower beds
could sue the owner of the dog for damages. This raises the peren-
nial problem of the possibility of a "flood of litigation" and this
might be one reason not to decide that the common law has been
changed. Another possibility is that families in urban areas might
decide that it was too much trouble to keep dogs, and the number
of dogs in urban areas would decrease. This might be interpreted
as good or bad, depending on the interpreter's feelings toward dogs.
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If the common law rule is taken to have been changed, the
problems of the person injured by a dog are not by any means over.
Dicta in the Buckle v. Holmes case'0 indicated that, where an animal
owner is liable for trespasses, it may be material to consider whether
the damage it does is the result of a normal propensity. For damage
done by the dog the Court in that case held, the owner is liable; but for
damage resulting from an abnormal propensity not known to him,
he is not liable. Thus, in a situation where a dog has caused real
and extensive damage, the person damaged might prefer to rely on
negligence which gives him a broader ability to claim for damages,
than the strict liability for animal trespass.
It is submitted that the course the courts have been following is
a preferable one to the alternative suggested. It is open to the courts
to decide that legislation like the statute and the by-law in the Caine
case only affects the individual's liability to the state, and leave the
rights of the person damaged to what they were at common law.
The law of negligence is the modern approach to the problem, and
should be adopted, rather than retreating to old rules of strict liability,
and as has been illustrated, the "negligence" approach leaves the
courts free to take into account local legislation and conditions and
extensive damage, as well as leaving them free to assess fault in the
animal owner. B.I.M.A.
Byers v. Bourbonnais, [1963] S.C.R. 117.
In Byers v. Bourbonnais,I the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed
an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal
Side, of the Province of Quebec2 whereby the defendant was absolved
from all liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to yield
the right of way at an unprotected intersection.
This case represents no new departure in the law and was appealed
solely on the question of liability. Taschereau J. in delivering the judg-
ment of the Court founded his decision on Section 83 of By-law No.
1319 of the City of Montreal which requires the driver of a car to
yield the right-of-way to a car approaching an intersection from the
former's right hand side. It was found that both cars were proceeding
at a reasonable rate of speed and the plaintiff's failure to yield was
the sole cause of the accident.
A.R.A.S.
10 Supra, footnote 8, at p. 130.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 117.
2 [1962] Que. Q.B. 270.
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